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#2A-6/21/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 912, AFSCME, 
Charging Party, 
-and 
CITY OF DUNKIRK, 
Respondent. 
RICHARD H. WYSSLING, ESQ., and CHARLES S. DE ANGELO, ESQ., 
for Charging Party 
MICHAEL BOLENDER, City Attorney, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City of 
Dunkirk (City) to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision 
finding it to have violated §§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed to promote 
James Giebner because of his activities on behalf of Local 912, 
AFSCME (AFSCME). In particular; the ALJ found that but for 
Geibner's participation in representation activity protected by 
the Act, he would have been appointed from a civil service 
eligible list from his bargaining unit position to the position 
of public works supervisor, a nonunit position. Based upon this 
finding of violation of the Act, the ALJ ordered that the City: 
1. Cease and desist from interfering with, 
restraining, coercing or discriminating against 
unit employees for the exercise of rights 
protected by the Act; 
CASE NO. U-9618 
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2. Immediately promote Geibner to the public works 
supervisor position; [footnote omitted] and 
3. Compensate Geibner for wages and benefits lost as a 
result of the City's failure to promote him in June of 
1987, with interest on any sum owing at the maximum 
legal rate; and 
. .4__ -S-i-gji=a-nd-eonsp-^  —-— 
attached in all locations throughout the City 
ordinarily used to communicate information to unit 
employees. 
In its exceptions, the City does not challenge the AKJ's 
determination that Geibner would have been appointed to the 
supervisory position but for his union activity, nor does it 
contest the finding of a violation of the Act based upon that 
factual finding. Instead, the exceptions presented by the City 
relate solely and exclusively to the issue of the appropriateness 
and the authority of the Board to order the relief recommended by 
the ALJ.l/ 
In view of the limited scope of the City's exceptions, the 
factual findings made by the ALJ are adopted in full and will not 
be repeated here.-2-/ However, during the oral argument before the 
I/At the time of oral argument before the Board on April 19, 
1990, the present counsel for the City sought to introduce a 
supplemental brief, which, he acknowledged, raised new and 
additional exceptions to the ALJ decision, including the finding 
of violation of the Act. The request was based upon a change in 
City Counsel on or about January 2, 1990. The Board denied the 
request because the submission of new issues for its 
consideration was well beyond the time for filing exceptions, and 
no motion to amend the exceptions was made within a reasonable 
period of time following the change in City Counsel four and one 
half months earlier. Denial of the request is confirmed here. 
2/see 22 PERB J[4590 (1989) . 
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) 
Board in this matter, the parties stipulated that Geibner was 
appointed to the at-issue public works supervisor position on 
February 12, 1990. The City's exceptions to the remedial relief 
recommended by the ALJ assert that the Board is without authority 
to^ d^ i-recfezJlei-bne-r^ s 
position and, because it is without authority to direct such an 
appointment, it is also without authority to order back pay 
representing the difference between the salary which Geibner was 
in fact paid in his lower level position and the salary which he 
would have been paid had he been promoted on June 22, 1987. 
In support of its argument, the City contends that the 
recommended relief exceeds PERB's authority and jurisdiction 
under §205.5(d) of the Act and/or unlawfully interferes with the 
authority of an appointing authority to exercise unfettered 
discretion to make appointments from a civil service eligible 
list. In support of these assertions, the City cites Ruggeri v. 
Hall, 101 A.D.2d 934, 475 N.Y.S. 2d 939 (3d Dep't 1984), and City 
of Schenectady v. State Division of Human Rights, 37 N.Y. 2d 421 
(1975). 
The question whether the Board has the statutory authority 
to direct the appointment of a particular individual is rendered 
moot, at least in part, because the City has in fact appointed 
Geibner to the promotional position from the civil service 
eligible list effective February 12, 1990. In view of this 
i intervening appointment, an order of appointment is no longer 
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necessary or required, and the ALJ's recommended order is 
modified accordingly. The question remains before us, however, 
to the extent that it may affect the Board's authority to order 
back pay from the date of the City's failure to appoint Geibner 
-^^=r^=:to^the^ date- of—his—actual—appointment „=r^ r^^ :^ _ _ _ 
Section 205.5(d) of the Act empowers the Board 
to issue a decision and order directing an 
offending party to cease and desist from any 
improper practice, and to take such 
affirmative action as will effectuate the 
policies of this article (but not to assess 
exemplary damages), including but not limited 
to the reinstatement of employees with or 
without back pay; . . . 
This broad statutory grant of remedial powers is similar to the 
) remedial powers accorded to the New York State Division of Human 
Rights (see Executive Law, §297(4)(c)). In City of Schenectady, 
supra, the Court of Appeals reviewed a determination of the 
Division of Human Rights (Division) that a woman had been 
unlawfully denied consideration for a promotion to Police 
Sergeant because of her sex. The Division had ordered the 
employer to offer the employee the next available promotional 
position and to pay her an amount equal to the salary difference 
between that for a police officer and that for a police sergeant 
from the date she was certified by the local Civil Service 
Commission to the date of promotion. The Court reversed this 
remedy and held that the Division was not empowered to offer the 
employee the next available promotional position, stating that 
) 
,o 
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[s]uch a direction would in effect deprive 
the appointing authority of the power of 
selection. Since the award of compensatory 
damages is dependent upon the offer of 
employment and since that part of the 
Commissioner's order is defective, the 
monetary award was also invalid. 37 N.Y.2d 
at 430. 
If this precedent is controlling, it would appear that, 
notwithstanding modification of the order of remedial relief 
recommended by the AKT to eliminate an order of appointment of 
Geibner to the promotional position, the portion of the remedial 
relief recommended relating to back pay must necessarily be 
stricken. 
However, in a subsequent case, State Division of Human 
) Rights v. County of Onondaga, 71 N.Y.2d 623 (1988), the Court of 
Appeals clarified its holding in City of Schenectady. In County 
of Onondagaf the Court confirmed the Division's determination 
that an employee was forced to resign her position because of her 
race and sex. In confirming the Division's order of 
reinstatement, the Court discussed the theory of remedial relief 
generally and the limits thereon. It limited the application of 
City of Schenectady to those situations in which an employee has 
not been considered fairly for an appointment, and not to 
circumstances in which a finding has been made that but for 
unlawful considerations, the individual would have been appointed 
to a position. 
The Court noted the breadth of the Division's remedial 
powers, which are limited only by the following criteria: 
Board - U-9618 -6 
1. The remedy must be reasonably related to the 
injury to be rectified; 
2. The remedy should put the employee in the 
position in which the employee would have 
been had the discrimination not taken place; 
and 
3... A -remedy—which-places—the-employee—in- a-
better position than he/she would have been 
but for the discrimination is inappropriate, 
but one which does not make the employee 
whole is equally inappropriate. 
The Court further observed that to preclude a reinstatement order 
would allow public officials to discriminate 
with impunity, leaving unlawfully discharged 
employees no recourse for reinstatement to 
employment. This result, at odds with both 
the purpose of the Human Rights Law and the 
duty of the Commissioner to make whole those 
victimized by discrimination, cannot be 
accepted by this Court. 71 N.Y.2d at 634. 
Applying the principles enunciated by the Court of Appeals 
in County of Onondaga, and in view of the uncontroverted finding 
of the ALJ that Geibner would have been promoted to the public 
works supervisor position but for the unlawful discrimination 
engaged in by the City, and in view of Geibner's appointment in 
fact to the position on February 12, 1990, the appropriate make-
whole remedy is an award of compensatory damages in an amount 
equal to the wages which Geibner would have earned had he been 
appointed on June 22, 1987, until his actual appointment on 
j 
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February 12, 1990.-2-/ We also conclude that City of Schenectady 
is distinguishable on its facts from the instant case, since City 
of Schenectady involved a failure to consider a candidate for 
unlawful discriminatory reasons, while the case before us 
-establishes—a-fai-lure^ 
reasons. In this regard, we are especially mindful of the 
analysis and concern expressed by the Court of Appeals in County 
of Onondaga, which cautions that remedial relief should not give 
3/ 
In so finding, we deem the award of compensatory damages to 
be entirely consistent with the relief ordered in the class of 
discrimination classes arising out of a refusal to hire for 
unlawful reasons. See, e.g., EEOC Policy Statement, adopted 
February 5, 1985, stating the agency's position on remedies for 
individual victims of employment bias, which provides in part as 
follows: 
Each identified victim of discrimination is 
entitled to an immediate and unconditional offer of 
placement in the respondent's workforce, to the 
position the discriminatee would have occupied absent 
discrimination, or to a substantially equivalent 
position, even if the placement of the discrimination 
results in the displacement of another of respondent's 
employees ("Nondiscriminatory Placement"). The 
Nondiscriminatory Placement may take place by initial 
employment, reinstatement, promotion, transfer or 
reassignment . . . " BNA Fair Employment Practices 
(FEP) Manual 405:3003 
The Policy also provides that: 
Each individual discriminatee must receive a sum 
of money equal to what would have been earned by the 
discriminatee in the employment loss through 
discrimination ("Gross Backpay"). BNA FEP Manual 
405:3003 
See also Overview of Judicial Remedies, BNA FEP Manual 431:301 
and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 10 FEP Cases 1181 
(1975) . 
n Board - U-9618 -8 
more to a victim of discrimination than that which he or she 
would have achieved but for the discrimination, while directing 
that relief should not fall short of placing an individual in the 
same position in which he or she would have been had the 
, d4sc:i^imi:nation=no^ — 
of compensatory damages were made, Geibner would be placed in the 
position of obtaining the appointment to the public works 
I supervisor position nearly three years after he would have 
received it had he not been discriminated against with 
concomitant loss of wages. Furthermore, a failure to award 
! compensatory damages would result in a finding of unlawful 
\ discrimination but no relief at all for the person discriminated 
against. The Board's broad grant of remedial process cannot be 
construed to produce such an anomalous result. Indeed, to find 
otherwise "would allow public officials to discriminate with 
impunity" (County of Onondaga, 71 N.Y.2d at 634). 
Based upon the foregoing, the City's exceptions relating to 
the remedial relief recommended by the ALJ are denied. However, 
that portion of the remedial relief which requires the City to 
"immediately promote Geibner to the public works supervisor 
position" is stricken upon the ground of mootness, and that 
portion of the remedial relief relating to compensation is 
modified to cover the period from June 22, 1987 to February 12, 
Board - U-9618 
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1990.4/ The exceptions are in all other respects denied, and the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the City: 
1. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, 
- coer-cdmg=or—dd-scrd^ ^^ ^ 
the exercise of rights protected by the Act; 
2. Compensate Geibner for wages and benefits lost as a 
result of the City's failure to promote him on June 22, 
1987, until February 12, 1990, with interest on any sum 
owing at the maximum legal rate; and 
3. Sign and conspicuously post a notice in the form 
attached in all locations throughout the City 
ordinarily used to communicate information to unit 
employees. 
DATED: June 21, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
UU^e^y.'i^i 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
•4/see Rules of Procedure, §204.14(c). 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all emoloyees of the City of Dunkirk in the unit 
represented by Locai #912, AFSCME, that the City: 
1. Will not interfere with, restrain, coerce or discriminate 
against unit employees for the exercise of rights protected 
by the Act; 
20 Will compensate James Giebner for wages and benefits lost as 
a result of the City's failure to nromote him on June 22, 
1987, until February 12, 1990, with interest on any sum 
owing at the maximum legal rate. 
CITY OF DUNKIRK 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALBANY POLICE OFFICERS UNION, LOCAL 2801, 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Chargijig=Party7^zz, 1 
CASE NO. U-10997 
CITY OF ALBANY, 
Respondent. 
ROWLEY, FORREST, O'DONNELL & HITE, P.C. (KEITH F. 
SCHOCKMEL, ESQ. and STEVEN KRAMER, ESQS., of Counsel), 
for Charging Party 
VINCENT J. McARDLE, JR., ESQ. (WILLIAM M. GOLDSTEIN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION 
This matter comes before us upon a motion by the Albany 
Police Officers Union, Local 2801, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO (Local 2801) to dismiss exceptions filed by the City of 
Albany (City) to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision 
dated March 28, 1990. Local 2801 moves to dismiss the 
exceptions upon the grounds that they are untimely filed and 
are not accompanied by proof of service upon it, as required 
by §204.10(a) of the Board's Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
-and-
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Section 204.10(a) Rules provides as follows: 
Within 15 working days after receipt of 
the decision and recommended order [of 
the ALJ], a party may file with the board 
an original and four copies of a 
statement in writing setting forth 
exceptions thereto or to any other part 
rulings upon motions or objections, and 
an original and four copies of a brief in 
support thereof shall be filed with the 
board simultaneously; at the same time, 
copies of such exceptions and briefs 
shall be served upon all other parties 
and proof of such service shall be filed 
with the board. 
In the instant case, counsel for the City made a timely 
written request for an extension of time within which to file 
exceptions "until May 4, 1990". Notwithstanding the 
objection of counsel for Local 2801 to the requested 
extension, the request for the extension until May 4, 1990 
was granted. Counsel for the City was notified in writing 
that "[e]xceptions will be deemed timely filed if postmarked 
on or before May 4, 1990".-1/ On May 8, 1990, the Board 
received copies of the City's exceptions and brief in support 
thereof in an envelope bearing a postmark of "May 7, 1990 
pm". No proof of service upon the other party was included 
in the materials received by the Board. 
According to the Motion to Dismiss Exceptions filed by 
Local 2801, its counsel also received a copy of the City's 
•1/May 4, 199 0 was a Friday. 
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exceptions and brief in an envelope on May 8, 1990, which was 
postmarked "May 7, 1990 pm". 
The City's Affirmation and Memorandum in Opposition to 
the Motion to Dismiss Exceptions asserts that the exceptions 
a^nd^ i^ i-eifz^  - =. 
to its mailroom for mailing on May 4, 1990, but that the 
City's counsel learned on Saturday, May 5, that the material 
had been returned from the mailroom to his office unmailed. 
The Affirmation further asserts that, one day later, on 
Sunday, May 6, 1990, the City's attorney placed the 
exceptions and brief in a U.S. Postal Service mailbox and has 
no knowledge as to why the postmark on the envelope then 
mailed bears a stamp of "May 7, 1990 pm." 
Although the City concedes that its exceptions were 
neither filed (i.e., actually mailed) nor postmarked on 
May 4, 1990, pursuant to its requested extension, it asserts 
that the exceptions are not in fact untimely because they 
were mailed before the next business day, May 7, 199 0. Thus, 
the City asks us to construe our Rules to permit a filing not 
only on or before the business day when it is required, but 
at any time prior to the commencement of the next business 
day. 
While it is certainly true that, pursuant to §20 General 
Construction Law, when the last day upon which an event may 
) occur falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the act may be 
Board - U-10997 
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completed on the next business day following, there is no 
doubt that here, the act of filing was required to be 
completed on a business day and no impediment to filing on 
that day therefore existed which would warrant the extension 
- ' — o f — t h e — t i m e — t o — f ^ ^ ^ — -
unsupported by any case law or provisions of the General 
Construction Law the argument of the City that a document 
required to be mailed on or before Friday, May 4 is in fact 
timely mailed if filed on Sunday, May 6. 
2/ 
The City asserts that because Local 2801 was on 
1 
i | unofficial notice (via newspaper reporting) that the City 
intended to file exceptions to the ALJ decision and 
recommended order, and because Local 2801 received a copy of 
the exceptions on May 8, 1990, within a reasonable amount of 
time after mailing was to have taken place, there is no 
prejudice to it, and the Motion to Dismiss Exceptions should 
be accordingly denied on that basis. 
In Catskill Regional OTB Corp., 14 PERB 53075 (1981), 
reconsidered and reversed at 14 PERB [^3 087 (1981) , we 
considered a situation in which exceptions were timely filed 
with PERB, but proof of service upon the opposing party was 
I not included in the filing, and it developed that the 
•^/Notwithstanding the direction that the exceptions be 
postmarked May 4, 1990, which they clearly were not, we would 
nevertheless deem the exceptions timely filed if the act of 
J mailing had taken place on May 4, in accordance with the 
definitions of filing and service contained in §2 00.10 Rules. 
Board - U-10997 
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exceptions served upon the opposing party were postmarked 
four days beyond the due date. We initially dismissed the 
exceptions, but reconsidered upon submission of evidence that 
the exceptions were timely mailed to the employer 
^^^notwi-thstaoid-i-ng^ 
3134): 
We have consistently applied the 
timeliness provisions of our Rules 
strictly when an affected party to a 
proceeding has urged us to do so.2/ 
2/ See, for example, Putnam County, 8 
PERB 53055 (1975); Nvack Union Free 
School District, 10 PERB [^3053 (1977) ; 
Onondaga Community College. 11 PERB [^3008 
(1978); Westbury Union Free School 
District. 12 PERB J3107 (1979) ; United 
Federation of Teachers. 13 PERB [^3101 
(1980) . 
In view of the failure of the City to file and serve its 
exceptions on or before May 4, 1990, which it was required to 
do, its failure to include proof of timely service upon 
opposing counsel, and its failure to establish the existence 
of extraordinary circumstances warranting any waiver of our 
Rules-3-/, the Motion to Dismiss Exceptions is granted and 
•^The City offers no explanation whatsoever for the failure 
to mail or deliver the exceptions on May 4, 1990, except to 
state that its mailroom did not do so. 
Board - U-10997 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the exceptions be, and they 
hereby are, dismissed. 
4/ 
DATED: June 21, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Itt&teuZ. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memfcer 
^ Based upon our review of the record in this matter, the 
credibility determinations made by the ALT, the decision 
itself and the City's exceptions, we note that even if we 
were to reach this matter on its merits rather than dismiss 
it on procedural grounds, we would dismiss the exceptions and 
affirm the ALJ decision. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8347 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
MORRIS E. ESON, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8664 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
MORRIS E. ESON, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8795 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent. 
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In the Matter of 
GORDON GALLUP, 
Charging Party, 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
•) UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS C. BARRY, pro se, in Case Nos. U-8347 and U-8859 
GLEN M. TAUBMAN, ESQ., National Right to Work Legal 
Defense Foundation, for Charging Parties in 
Case Nos. U-8664, U-8795 and U-8890 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ. (IVOR MOSKOWITZ, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Respondent in Case Nos. U-8347, U-8664, U-8795, 
U-8890 and U-8859 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These matters were the subject of a consolidated 
Decision and Order, issued by this Board on July 8, 1987, 
which held that the United University Professions (UUP) 
violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
CASE-NO .~U^8 89 Q-— 
CASE NO. U-8859 
N Board - U-8347, U-8664, U-8795, U-8890, U-8859 -3 
J 
Act (Act) with respect to several aspects of UUP's agency 
shop fee refund procedures for fiscal years (FY) 1984-85, 
1985-86, and 1986-87.i/ 
Thereafter, UUP appealed the Board's Decision and Order 
= — to^the=rSaipreme^eour-t>-"Al:bany— eonmty-^ =se-ek-i;ng=rev-&rsal=a-nd-
asserting that the Board had failed to address its claims of 
lack of standing of Thomas C. Barry in Case Nos. U-8347 and 
U-8859, and its claims of untimeliness in the filing of the 
charges in Case Nos. U-8347 and U-8664. Pursuant to an Order 
of Transfer on Consent, the matter was transferred to the 
' Appellate Division, Third Department, and, on April 27, 1989, 
the Appellate Division issued an opinion which affirmed the 
substantive findings of violation of the Act made by the 
Board, but modified the Board's order insofar as it directed 
: the payment of refunds to all charging parties "without first 
passing on petitioner's procedural objections". Matter of 
United University Professions v. Newman, 146 A.D.2d 273, 
22 PERB 57012 (3d Dep't 1989). The Appellate Division 
directed remittitur of the matters to this Board for 
determinations concerning the procedural deficiencies in the 
charges alleged by UUP. 
2/ 
Vsee 20 PERB f3052 (1987) . 
^•/NO procedural deficiencies were the subject of exceptions 
in Case Nos. U-8890 and 8759, and no discussion of those 
) cases is required herein. 
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UUP thereupon moved for permission to appeal to the 
New York State Court of Appeals. That motion was denied on 
October 26, 1989, 
3/ 
rendering the Appellate Division decision 
a final determination in these matters. Pursuant to the 
supplemental argument or briefs to it concerning the 
procedural issues of standing and timeliness. The parties 
having declined to make any supplemental submissions, the 
matters are now before us for disposition. 
U-8347 
The first procedural claim made by UUP in connection 
"\ with Case No. U-8347 is that Barry failed to allege that he 
is an agency fee payer and, accordingly, failed to establish 
on the face of the charge that he has standing to file it. 
! However, in the Details of Charge, Barry asserts that he is 
an "independent" employee from whom an agency fee is 
collected and further alleges that "I bring this improper 
practise (sic) charge for myself and all other independent 
employees of SUNY forced to pay tribute to the UUP and the 
trade unions with which it is affiliated." The assigned 
Administrative Law Judge (AKT) found these allegations 
sufficient to identify Barry's status as a member of the UUP 
bargaining unit and an agency fee payer, with standing to 
2/74 N.Y.2d 64, 22 PERB [^7033 (1989). 
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file the charge.4/ We fully agree with the AKT' s 
determination, and find, based upon the allegations contained 
in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Details of Charge, that Barry 
sufficiently identified himself and his standing to file it, 
-sd-nce-7—in=contex-t^i-t—is—more=than^;reasonaibile—to—cQn^elude^:1^^^ 
that Barry's use of the term "independent" is properly 
interpreted to mean a non-UUP member who is required by 
§208.3(a) of the Act to make agency fee payments. UUP's 
exception in this regard is, accordingly, denied. 
UUP also asserts that Barry's charge, dated October 7, 
1985, is untimely in that it challenges aspects of the agency 
fee refund procedure for UUP's FY 1984-85 and FY 1985-86, 
which run from September 1 to August 31. UUP argues that as 
to any aspect of the agency fee refund procedures utilized 
for 1984-85 and 1985-86, the charge is untimely if Barry knew 
or should have known about those aspects of the procedure 
more than four months prior to the filing of the charge, 
pursuant to §204.1(a)(1) of the Board's Rules of Procedure 
(Rules). 
With respect to FY 1984-85, Barry alleges violations of 
the Act at numerous points in UUP's agency fee procedure, 
which, as in any fiscal year, commenced before the beginning 
of the fiscal year and ended after the conclusion of the 
fiscal year. Thus, Barry alleges, among other things, a 
4/l9 PERB ^4603, at 4741 note 1 (1986). 
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failure by UUP to conduct an advance reduction hearing prior 
to the commencement of FY 1984-85, goes on to assert that 
before, during and after the fiscal year UUP required him to 
communicate with it by certified or registered mail, and that 
-" ~~ UUP—fa~EL-ed—to~^ " ' 
of the fiscal year concerning the proper amount of the refund 
owing to him which represents the portion of agency fees 
representing his "pro rata share of expenditures by the 
organization in aid of activities or causes of a political or 
ideological nature only incidentally related to terms and 
conditions of employment." Section 208.3(a) Act. UUP argues 
that Barry was obligated to file his charge within four 
months after receiving a copy of its written agency fee 
refund procedure (which was published in the July 1984 issue 
of UUP's newspaper, The Voice) as to any and all aspects of 
the procedure which he contends violate the Act. 
However, in Middle Country Teachers Association 
(Werner) . 21 PERB 53012 (1988) , the Board clarified the 
fashion in which the four-month limitation period is 
appropriately applied to the filing of improper practice 
charges. We there held, at 3026, that 
a party has standing to file an improper | practice charge within four months after 
notification of a decision to perform an 
! action alleged to be violative of the 
Act. The party may also await 
performance of the action and file an 
) improper practice charge within four 
months after the intended action is 
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actually implemented and the charging 
party is injured thereby. 
While we agree with UUP that Barry could have filed his 
charge within four months after receipt of a copy of the 
refund procedure, at least with respect to the statements 
contained therein, we find that he also was entitled to await 
implementation of each aspect of the procedure and file a 
charge within four months after that aspect of the procedure 
alleged to violate the Act was implemented and he was injured 
thereby. Thus, if Barry was injured by a portion of the 
agency fee refund procedure within four months prior to the 
filing of his charge on October 7, 1985, the charge is timely 
as to that portion, although it would not be timely with 
respect to any aspects of the procedure completed prior to 
the commencement of the four-month period. 
Applying these principles to the instant case, it is our 
finding that Barry's charge with respect to the FY 1984-85 
procedure is untimely insofar as it alleges a failure to 
conduct advance reduction procedures prior to the 
commencement of the 1984-85 fiscal year, more than one year 
earlier. Furthermore, the portion of Barry's charge which 
alleges that objectors are improperly required to notify UUP 
by registered or certified mail of their appeals at the 
advance reduction step of the procedure must also be 
dismissed. There is no evidence before us that Barry was 
required to make any certified mailings concerning the 1984-
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85 advance reduction procedure within four months of the 
filing of the charge, and he was also aware of the 
requirement upon publication of the 1984-85 procedure. 
We are faced with a different issue with respect to the 
time:l"i-nesS"0:f=the=^ portdon—of—the—charge^ whd-ch—a-1-l-eges—t^ ha^ tp^ =^ — ' ~-
the end-of-year decision by a neutral was not promptly 
completed for FY 1984-85. Because the charge was filed only 
five weeks following the close of that fiscal year, well 
before UUP could reasonably have been expected to complete 
its year-end audit, make a year-end fee determination, 
communicate that determination to agency fee payers, give 
them an opportunity to object to the determination, and 
conduct a hearing on the objections, the charge, as 
originally filed, failed to establish a violation of the 
Act.5-/ However, on April 4, 1986, Barry requested, and was 
later allowed, to amend his charge to allege, among other 
things, that he was required to object to the end-of-year 
refund determination for the 1984-85 fiscal year, by 
certified mail and that the year-end procedures for FY 1984-
85 were not reasonably prompt because an end-of-year 
determination, based upon audits by then received by UUP, was 
communicated to agency fee payers on or about March 21, 1986, 
Vsee UUP fBarrv), 22 PERB ^3003 (1989), wherein this Board 
held that a lapse of ten weeks between the date of filing of 
the objection to an agency fee advance reduction 
determination and the date of hearing on that objection was 
neither excessive nor unreasonable. 
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with objections to be filed within 30 days thereafter. As 
of the date of the hearing in this matter (May 15, 1986), no 
refund hearing had been conducted. 
On the basis of the April 14, 1986 amendment to the 
^^^^z^^ehaxge^rasrrto;^^ 
that Barry's allegations concerning the failure to conduct a 
reasonably prompt end-of-year hearing and the requirement to 
file objections to the year-end determination by certified 
mail are timely. 
Those portions of Barry's charge relating to aspects of 
the 1984-85 agency fee refund procedure which were both 
announced and implemented more than four months prior to the 
filing of the charge are untimely, and are therefore 
dismissed. Barry is nevertheless entitled to the refund of 
his agency fee, as ordered by this Board in its decision of 
July 8, 1987, on the bases of the charge found timely, i.e., 
that UUP's end-of-year refund appeal procedure was not 
conducted reasonably promptly and that he was required to 
object to the year-end refund amount by certified mail. See 
20 PERB f3039, at 3075. The Board's order of refund of the 
agency fees paid by Barry for FY 1984-85 is, accordingly, 
confirmed. 
With respect to the 1985-86 fiscal year, Barry's charge 
was filed within four months of the time when the advance 
i reduction procedures for that year would or should have taken 
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place. In particular, Barry was required to file his 
objection to the amount of the advance reduction determination 
by certified mail, which he did on September 27, 1985, 
shortly before the charge was filed. He also alleges that 
UUP^fai-lre'd—to—eon~dure^^ 
hearing prior to the commencement of the fiscal year, which 
began on September 1, 1985, also within four months of the 
filing of the charge. Based upon these timely allegations, 
which support our finding of violation of the Act with 
respect to various portions of the 1985-86 agency fee refund 
procedure, the remedial relief ordered of refund of the 
agency fee paid by Barry during FY 1985-86 is also confirmed. 
U-8664 
UUP asserts that Case No. U-8664, filed by Morris E. 
Eson, is untimely, in that it alleges that numerous aspects 
of the agency fee refund procedures utilized by UUP for the 
1984-85 and 1985-86 fiscal years violate the Act, because the 
charge was filed on or about April 2, 198 6. 
To the extent that Eson alleges violations of the Act by 
virtue of UUP's failure to conduct advance reduction 
determination hearings prior to the commencement of fiscal 
year 1984-85, the charge is, as UUP argues, untimely, since 
an advance reduction determination hearing should have been 
held, if required by the Act, prior to or reasonably promptly 
after September 1, 19 84. 
I ) 
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With respect, however, to the claim of violation by 
failure to provide a reasonably prompt end-of-year 
determination and review procedure for FY 1984-85, the charge 
is timely, since it was filed within four months of Eson's 
noM-f-icatd-on—by—UUff^^ — 
entitled to any further rebate" for that year. Eson's 
allegation that inadequate financial information was provided 
for FY 1984-85 for purposes of a year-end determination 
concerning the appropriate amount of agency fee refund is 
also timely, and the order of refund for 1984-85 paid by him 
is, accordingly, confirmed. 
Finally, with respect to Eson's challenge to the 1985-86 
procedure, to the extent that it alleges a violation of the 
Act based upon the failure to conduct an advance reduction 
determination hearing prior to the commencement of the 1985-
86 fiscal year, the charge is timely because it was filed 
within four months of the time when Eson could reasonably 
have expected a hearing to have taken place with respect to 
the determination of the advance reduction amount. In view 
of this determination, the order of remedial relief, insofar 
as it directs the restoration to Eson of agency fees paid by 
him for FY 1985-86 is also confirmed. 
U-8859 
The last remaining procedural claim made by UUP, in 
) connection with Case No. U-8859, repeats the same claim of 
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lack of standing and failure to allege agency fee payer 
status on the part of Barry, the charging party in this 
matter. However, No. 1 of the Details of Charge in this 
matter provides as follows: 
I^ami^forced—to=pay—a—so^ca-l-l-ed=^agency=— 
fee" to the UUP. 
Based upon this language, we find, as we found in 
connection with Case No. U-8347, supra, that Barry 
sufficiently established his status as a member of the 
bargaining unit represented by UUP, and his status as an 
agency fee payer, and accordingly has appropriate standing to 
file his charge. This exception is, accordingly, denied and 
our determination confirmed in this regard. 
Having found no other procedural exceptions not 
specifically addressed heretofore in these proceedings, the 
refund of agency fees previously ordered by this Board is 
confirmed for the reasons set forth herein. 
DATED: June 21, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
1/U4HCL. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe, 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HAVERLING TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2717, 
Charging Party, 
and— - — -— GASE^NO^U-107a7 
BATH CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
DIANE McMORDIE, for Charging Party 
HOGAN & SARZYNSKI, ESQS. (JOHN B. HOGAN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Bath 
Central School District (District) to an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALT) decision which found it to have violated §§2 09-
a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment 
Act (Act) by abolishing an Early Literacy In-Service Course 
(ELIC) program in January 1989 in retaliation for a demand to 
negotiate made by the Haverling Teachers Association, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, Local 2717 (Local 2717). In particular, the 
ALT found that the District discontinued the ELIC program 
because Local 2717 demanded negotiations concerning the terms 
and conditions of employment of those bargaining unit members 
who volunteered to participate in the program. 
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In its exceptions, the District argues that because 
participation in the program was "voluntary and to occur 
after hours . . . , participation in this voluntary after-
school hour program pertaining to professional skills is not 
— :—--— a^mandatory^topiciriof—barg 
it is not participation in the ELIC program which is the 
subject of the instant charge. What is alleged by Local 2 717 
is that the District had a duty to negotiate with it 
concerning the terms and conditions of employment of those 
persons who in fact volunteered to participate in the 
program, that the District's failure and refusal to do so 
\ constitutes a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act, and that 
the elimination of the ELIC program in its entirety 
constituted retaliation for the demand to negotiate those 
terms and conditions of employment on behalf of unit member 
volunteers, in violation of §§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act. 
In essence, Local 2717 sought to negotiate the impact 
upon its members of the establishment of the ELIC program, 
which it has a statutory right to do. We therefore dismiss 
.. that portion of the District's exceptions which alleges that 
the ALJ improperly found a violation of the duty to negotiate 
in good faith with respect to a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiations, upon the ground that the impact of the 
i/s ee, e.g., West Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. PERB, 35 
) N.Y.2d 46, 7 PERB ^7014 (1974); North Babylon UFSD, 7 PERB 
53027 (1974). 
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District's implementation of the voluntary ELIC program upon 
terms and conditions of employment is a mandatory subject of 
negotiations. 
The District next argues that because Local 2717 failed 
to—expl-ad^,—upon=demand=F^^^^ 
extent of the duty to negotiate the "implementation" of the 
ELIC program, it waived its right, if any, to negotiate. 
However, approximately one week after the letter demand to 
clarify was forwarded to Local 2717's representative, the 
District announced its intention to discontinue the ELIC 
program. At that point, clarification of the demand to 
. negotiate was made futile. Based upon this rapid sequence of 
events, we find that Local 2717 did not waive its right to 
negotiate by virtue of its failure to clarify its demand to 
do so prior to the District's announcement of its intent to 
eliminate the program. The District's exception in this 
regard is denied. 
The District next argues that because Local 2717 was 
found to have committed an improper practice (i.e. issuance 
of a threat of imminent strike) during the same period when 
the events giving rise to the instant charge took place, 
Local 2717 is, in effect, equitably estopped from filing its 
own improper practice charge. However, commission of an 
improper practice by one party neither negates the commission 
) of, nor precludes the filing of a charge in connection with, 
U-10787 - Board 
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an improper practice committed by the other party except in 
limited circumstance
 S 2 / which are not here present. The 
District does not assert that it discontinued the ELIC 
program because of a threat of imminent strike (see Haverlincr 
. — C S B 7 — 2 2—P£RB—f4 5 54=(fi:9 8^^^  
the ALT's finding that it discontinued the program because 
Local 2717 demanded to negotiate concerning its 
implementation. The District's exception in this regard is, 
accordingly, denied. 
Finally, the District contends that the ALT erred in 
i directing it to "reinstate" the ELIC program and negotiate 
i \ with Local 2717 the terms and conditions of employment of the 
ten teachers *>.Tho volunteered to participate in it. However, 
in view of the uncontroverted finding by the ALT that the 
ELIC program was discontinued in retaliation for the demand 
by Local 2717 to negotiate concerning terms and conditions of 
employment of persons who voluntarily agreed to participate 
in the program, so that the program would have continued in 
effect but for the motivation proscribed by the Act, 
reinstatement of the program represents appropriate remedial 
relief. Similarly, having concluded that Local 2717 was 
entitled to negotiate the impact of the creation of the 
voluntary ELIC program upon terms and conditions of 
employment, the order to the District that it negotiate such 
j 
3/City of Newburgh, 15 PERB 13116 (1982). 
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terms and conditions of employment with Local 2717 is also 
appropriate. 
Based upon the foregoing, the exceptions of the District 
are denied in their entirety, and the Decision and 
-Recoimended—Order^of=t-h^^ 
affirmed. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District: 
1. Forthwith reinstate the ELIC program that it 
discontinued in January 1989; 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the Association with 
respect to terms and conditions of employment for 
employees involved in ELIC; 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
ordinarily used to communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: June 21, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
NICE TO ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in orcUr to afUctuata tha polici** of tha 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
w« haraby notify 
all employees in the unit represented by the Haverling 
Teachers' Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2717 that the 
Bath Central School District will: 
1. Forthwith reinstate the ELIC program 
that it discontinued in January 1989; 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the 
Association with respect to terms and 
conditions of employment for employees 
involved in ELIC. 
.Bath. Central- -School- -District 
Datad B* (R«pr«»«nUtlv») (Tltte) 
This Notice must remain posted ,or 30 consecutive days trom the date of posting, and must not be site, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 






CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 833, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
THOMAS J. KRAJCI, for Petitioner 
JOHN S. BALZANO, ESQ., for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (MAUREEN SEIDEL and 
JEROME LEFKOWITZ, ESQS., of Counsel), for 
Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Oneida County Caseworker Association (Association) 
excepts to the dismissal of its petition which seeks 
decertification of the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 833, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) and its certification 
as the exclusive negotiating agent for employees of the 
County of Oneida (County) in the positions of caseworker, 
senior caseworker, case supervisor "B", and case supervisor 
"A". The Association bases its petition primarily upon a 
claim that the incumbent bargaining agent, CSEA, has failed 
CASE NO. C-3527 
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to represent adequately the interests of caseworkers, 
primarily with regard to efforts to achieve a salary 
reallocation for employees in the caseworker series, and, 
secondarily, with respect to resolution of automobile 
-~- ~i-nsur^ance—Mabi~l-ity— and— subcontract±ng=i-ssues-.- -= 
In support of its contention that the Director of Public 
! Employment Practices and Representation (Director) erred in 
| dismissing its fragmentation petition, the Association 
contends that this Board has established, and the Director 
has applied, a standard for review of fragmentation petitions 
which contravenes the public policy outlined in the Public 
\ Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act). The standard to which 
the Association refers has been described by this Board as 
follows: 
This Board has long adhered to two ruling 
principles in deciding uniting questions. 
First, we have held that "[i]t is the 
policy of the Act to find appropriate the 
largest unit permitting for effective 
negotiations." [footnote omitted]. The 
second long-standing principle to which 
we have adhered is that fragmentation of 
existing bargaining units will not be 
granted in the absence of compelling 
evidence of the need to do so. [footnote: 
See, e.g. Deer Park UFSD, 22 PERB f3014 
(1989); State of New York, 21 PERB ^3050 
(1988); Chautauqua County BOCES, 15 PERB 
53126 (1982).] We have held that 
compelling need is generally established 
by proving the existence of a conflict of 
interest or inadequate representation, 
[footnote: id.] State of New York (Long 
Island Park, Recreation and Historical 
) Preservation Commission) , 22 PERB ^ [3043, 
at 3098 (1989). 
/ 
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In that case we held, at 3099, that the evidence established 
neither the type of systematic and 
intentional disregard of the interests of 
the petitioned-for group, nor the neglect 
or indifference to the interests of the 
group which would warrant the 
fragmentation sought. 
We have previously determined, and we now confirm, that 
the standard articulated by this Board for deciding 
fragmentation petitions is one which, in our view, reasonably 
balances the dual public policies found in the Act favoring 
both stability in labor relations and focus upon substantive 
negotiating issues on one hand, and freedom of choice with 
respect to a bargaining agent on the other. The 
•> Association's exception in this regard is accordingly denied. 
We have carefully reviewed the record in this case, and 
find that the Director's dismissal of the petition should be 
affirmed, because the Association has failed to meet its 
burden of establishing proof of either intentional conduct 
adverse to the interests of the petitioned-for group or such 
disregard for the interests of the group as would warrant 
fragmentation. 
Notwithstanding the Association's claim that CSEA sought 
to undermine a reallocation application considered by the 
County's Legislature in 1981, its claim, as found by the 
Director, is unsupported by probative evidence because it 
consists of testimony of officers of the Association who 
received comments eight years earlier from one or more 
Board - C-3527 -4 
unidentified legislators that a question existed whether CSEA 
supported the petition. We deem this hearsay testimony to be 
too remote and unreliable to support a claim of intentional 
acts of conduct adverse to the interests of the group. 
Since-198-lr-the -only -other^ ^^  -
reallocation efforts by and on behalf of the caseworker 
series appears to have been the negotiation of language into 
the most recent collective bargaining agreement between the 
County and CSEA which created a committee to review 
reallocation requests. Pursuant to that language, a 
reallocation request was prepared by CSEA and submitted to 
the committee, which rejected the application. The 
Association makes no claim that CSEA intentionally withheld 
support for the application when last presented. Indeed, no 
claim is made that the reallocation application submitted by 
CSEA on behalf of the caseworker series was inadequate or 
incomplete in any way. The fact that efforts to persuade the 
County to reallocate positions in the caseworker series have 
proved unsuccessful does not establish a failure to 
represent adequately employees in the affected group.-1/ 
For the foregoing reasons, based on the record before 
us, we affirm the Director's determination that, with respect 
to the efforts to obtain reallocation of caseworker positions 
•^State of New York (Long Island Park, Recreation and 
Historical Preservation Commission), supra, at 3099 (1989). 
' " ) 
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in the County, CSEA neither engaged in an intentional 
disregard of the interests of the petitioner-for group, nor 
neglected the interests of the group. 
The Association also contends that CSEA failed to 
r=pu-rsue=ade quat e-ly^ therzgiie st-i o rt^ oibiautomebJdb.e=M.-a-bil-i t y — -
insurance for caseworkers engaged in County business in their 
own vehicles. However, the record establishes that the 
County was approached by CSEA concerning this issue and that 
an indemnification and self-insurance program is in place. 
While this information may not have been adequately conveyed 
to affected unit members, the record fails to establish a 
neglect of the interests of the unit members with respect to 
this issue. 
Finally, with respect to the issue of subcontracting, 
the record indicates that while some subcontracting has taken 
place within the County, there is no evidence that such 
subcontracting has applied primarily or exclusively to 
caseworker duties, nor is there any indication that any unit 
member in the caseworker series has been adversely affected 
by the subcontracts. While CSEA may be entitled to negotiate 
with the County concerning subcontracts as a matter of right 
under the Act,-2/ its apparent policy determination that it 
will not challenge subcontracts unless present bargaining 
-2/see, e.g. , Saratoga Springs CSD, 11 PERB ^3037, conf'df 68 
A.D.2d 202, 12 PERB 57008 (3d Dep't 1979), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 
711, 12 PERB 57012 (1979). 
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unit members are adversely affected is one which is within 
its discretion to adopt and does not rise to the level of 
inadequate representation required to grant a fragmentation 
petition. 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 21, 199 0 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Mesiber 
#3A-6/21/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Peta1:iaher7 
- a n d - CASE NO. C - 3 6 7 0 
GREENE COUNTY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 294, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Those employees within the Solid Waste 
Management Department in the following 
Certification - C-3 670 - 2 -
positions: transfer station operator, 
equipment operator and all other blue collar 
positions which may be established by the 
County. 
Excluded: All other employees, including foremen, 
clerical, professional and technical employees, 
those appointed and those employed in 
~ ~ ~ ^ ^el-ass-i-M^cat^ 
nature. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: June 21, 1990 
Albany, New York 
j^Lj^^j/Q? 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^u^£c- ?1 
Walter L. E i senbe rg , Memfter 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, 
Petitioner, 
-^md— " - -— -,-.-,_.-- — -GALSE=NO=^C-3:585 ~~^-~-
TOWN OF WARSAW, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 2 64 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time motor equipment operators and the 
deputy superintendent of highways. 
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Excluded: Highway superintendent, employees who work only 
on snow removal on an as-needed basis, and all 
other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 2 64. The duty 
-to=Tiegotia-te^co!=l-eG^ 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 21, 199 0 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#3C-6/21/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 317, 
Petitioner, 
T •,.____and.__ ..__.. __ _.______1^ r, CASE=:NO.=C-3674 -
WESTHILL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
.' accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 317 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All regularly scheduled bus drivers and bus 
aides. 
) Excluded: Transportation supervisor and per diem 
substitute bus drivers and bus aides. 
O 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 317. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 21, 1990 
Albany, New York 
tftsurttf/f?AU* '^S^ftA 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, MembeS 
#3D-6/21/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
) 
In the Matter of 
ONONDAGA-CORTLAND-MADISON BOCES FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, NYSUT, AFT, LOCAL 2897, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3464 
ONONDAGA-CORTLAND-MADISON_„BQCES_, _, __ _ „„ _ 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Onondaga-Cortland-Madison 
BOCES Federation of Teachers, NYSUT, AFT, Local 2897 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All professionals providing direct student 
services including the following full and part-
time employees: elementary, secondary and 
adult education teachers, occupational 
education teachers, itinerant teachers, special 
education teachers, speech therapists, 
psychologists, teacher assistants, guidance 
counselors, school nurse teachers, physical and 
occupational therapists, occupational therapy 
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assistants, school audiologists, school nurse 
and nurse practitioner, long-term substitutes 
who are employed for at least a semester or 
more for a period of five consecutive months as 
replacements for absent teachers who are 
expected to return, diversified work study 
coordinators, awareness placement counselors, 
substance abuse counselor, school librarian, 
school social worker, vocational evaluator, 
vocational evaluator assistant, employment and 
training counselor, employment services 
_„ spe.cialist^,^3^ocational„rehabAlitatio_n 
counselor, program coordinator and counselor, 
who work more than 12 hours per week. 
Excluded: District superintendent, deputy superintendent, 
assistant superintendent, any other supervisory 
position requiring administrative certification 
from the State Education Department, per diem 
substitutes, summer school teachers, teacher 
trainee, and adult education enrichment program 
teachers. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Onondaga-Cortland-Madison 
BOCES Federation of Teachers, NYSUT, AFT, Local 2897. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 21, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
C«* A • 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#3E-6/21/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, 
Petitioner, 
— " =^and^ ' " ' ~ — — — ~ ~ CASg=N0^=G=35ff3— 
TOWN OF SHELDON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 2 64 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time motor equipment 
operators and the deputy superintendent of 
highways. 
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Excluded: Highway Superintendent, employees who work only 
on snow removal on an as-needed basis, seasonal 
employees and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 2 64. The duty 
o^=n~egofeira-te=e©^ ^^  
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 21, 1990 
Albany, New York 
-*"s.. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb&a: 
#3F-6/21/90 
^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 2 64, 
Petitioner, 
___ -.-^^a^^zzz^—=: =z=^ :z^  GASE=NO==G-3 5 86 " "" 
TOWN OF MIDDLEBURY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 2 64 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time motor equipment operators and the 
deputy superintendent of highways. 
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Excluded: Highway superintendent, employees who work only 
on snow removal on an as-needed basis, and all 
other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 264. The duty 
-to^negoti^t^^ 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if r.equested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 21, 199 0 
Albany, New York 
•~-y%Zo<e & *£: 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
A ^ ^ S K * 2 ^ - ^ * 
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g , Mem]per 
